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THE CREATION OF A SEPARATE RULE OF
REASON: ANTITRUST LIABILITY FOR
THE EXCHANGE OF PRICE
INFORMATION AMONG
COMPETITORS
In cases brought under the Sherman Act,' the courts have devel-
oped a two-tier standard for evaluating the legality of the challenged
business practice. The "per se" test is reserved for certain oft-encoun-
tered practices that are presumed to be illegal without further inquiry.
The rule of reason is a more extensive test that seeks to find whether
the particular practice, on balance, tends to promote or suppress com-
petition.2 According to standard antitrust analysis, the exchange of
price information among competitors should be viewed under the rule
of reason unless a specific agreement to fix prices is disclosed. For an
accurate determination of the effect of price information exchanges on
competition,3 it would seem that the rule of reason analysis should in-
dude an examination of the economic characteristics of the market in
which the price information dissemination occurs.4
Recent decisions by the Supreme Court, however, have refused to
include an investigation of market structure in the rule of reason analy-
sis. By so doing they have abandoned the standard of an earlier deci-
THE FOLLOWING CITATION WILL BE USED IN THIS COMMENT:
R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976) [hereinafter cited as R.
POSNER].
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
2. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 73 (1977).
3. In this Comment, the term "price information exchange" includes all exchanges of prices
between competitors, except agreements or conspiracies with the specific intent to fix prices. Ex-
change of price information exemplifies Chief Justice Burger's statement that "the behavior pro-
scribed by the [Sherman] Act is often difficult to distinguish from the gray zone of socially
acceptable and economically justifiable business conduct." United States v. United States Gyp-
sum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 440-41 (1978).
4. Price fixing or price stabilization can lead to the equivalent of monopoly conditions in
terms of both profits and reduced output, especially in more concentrated markets. Thus, price
stability can be indicative of a noncompetitive market. See E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS
325-29, 347-48 (2d ed. 1975); F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 158-82 (1970). The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Douglas,
has noted that "[p]rice is too critical, too sensitive a control to allow it to be used even in an
informal manner to restrain competition." United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 338
(1969). In addition, for both antitrust enforcement agencies and the consumer, price is the most
obvious and measurable parameter in most instances.
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sion, United States v. Container Corp.5 This trend first became evident
in a pair of decisions condemning the pricing policies of professional
organizations, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar6 and National Society of
Professional Engineers v. United States.7 Previously, it had been as-
sumed that the activity of a professional association, such as the distri-
bution of an advisory fee schedule, was exempt from prosecution under
the antitrust laws.8 Although the Supreme Court, in the Goldfarb and
Society of Professional Engineers cases renounced an unlimited exemp-
tion from Sherman Act liability for the learned professions, it clearly
recognized some form of distinction between professional and commer-
cial practices. 9 Yet, the Society of Professional Engineers Court flatly
refused to allow any distinction when the alleged violation involved
competitive pricing, indicating that the Supreme Court intends to deal
harshly with price information exchanges.
The issue of permissible exchanges of price information was ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court most recently in United States v. United
States Gypsum Co. 0 Once again, the insights offered by the Container
Corp. decision were ignored and the rule of reason analysis employed
by the Court was limited to a discussion of the details of the specific
practice without consideration of market characteristics. Moreover, the
Court rejected an exception to Sherman Act liability created by the
lower courts. This exception had exempted competitors from charges
of price fixing when they engaged in a system of price verification for
purposes of complying with the good faith requirement of the "meeting
competition" defense to Robinson-Patman Act liability.1' The implica-
tion is that the rule of reason used for price information exchange is
5. 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
6. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
7. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
8. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 775 (1975). See text accompanying
note 77 infra.
9. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. at 788 n.17.
10. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976). The thrust of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13c,
21a (1976), is to prevent price discrimination by sellers negotiating with buyers. Two types of
injury to competition are intended to be avoided: primary-line injury (injury to competition
among sellers) and secondary-line injury (injury to competition among buyers). U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 4-5 (1977). The chief intention of Congress
was to prevent the latter form of injury, since prior to enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act,
many large retail buyers had forced large price concessions from sellers to the detriment of smaller
buyers. 16B J. VON KALINowSKI, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS-ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE
REGULATION §§ 21.03-.06 (1977). Section 2(b) of the Act establishes the meeting competition
defense, which permits a seller to lower his price for a particular buyer to the exclusion of other
buyers if he has a good faith belief that the buyer has been offered such a lower price elsewhere.
Id. § 22.03.
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confined to a preliminary inquiry into the details of the dissemination
and excludes evidence of any other competitive justification.
The purpose of this Comment is to evaluate the rule of reason
standard applied by the Supreme Court to practices involving ex-
changes of price information among competitors. In so doing, the dis-
cussion will identify the weaknesses in the procedure adopted by the
Court and will explore the import of the Supreme Court holdings for
the future of price information exchanges.
I. THE RULE OF REASON AND THE PER SE RULE-APPLICATION IN
THE PRICE INFORMATION EXCHANGE CONTEXT
The modem rule of reason involves, in theory, four basic steps of
analysis:12 (1) identifying the practice involved,' 3 (2) determining the
purpose of the practice,' 4 (3) identifying the likely effects of the prac-
tice, 15 and (4) determining whether, on balance, the restriction impeded
12. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, § 68.
13. This Comment concentrates on those situations in which the particular practice, some
form of price information exchange, is clearly identified; the main concern is the remaining com-
ponents of the modem rule of reason. However, identifying the actual collusive practice, particu-
larly when the anticompetitive restraint is a form of collusive pricing, can be very complex. This
problem arises quite often in oligopolistic industries where tacit collusion can have the same ef-
fects as explicit pricing agreements. See Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman
Act" Conscious Parallelism andRefusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L. REV. 655 (1962). Turner claims that
due to the interdependent nature of oligopoly pricing (oligopolistic firms base their pricing deci-
sions on the anticipated reaction of their competitors), tacit collusion among oligopolists in re-
fraining from lowering prices is rational economic behavior. Consequently, he argues that this
entire spectrum of relatively ambiguous behavior should be beyond the scope of section 1 of the
Sherman Act, as there is no remedy that will promote efficient, rational economic behavior. How-
ever, it has been argued that this conceals many crucial factual assumptions, that tacit collusion
can actually be established by extrinsic evidence, and hence, that it is not beyond the scope of the
Sherman Act. See Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws.- A Suggested.Approach, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 1562, 1575-93 (1969).
14. Under the rule of reason, it is generally held that a violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act can be established by demonstrating either an unlawful purpose or an anticompetitive effect.
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 436 n.13. But the Gypsum Court decided
that in the case of a criminal prosecution, the government must demonstrate both an intent and an
anticompetitive effect. Id. at 435-43. See text accompanying notes 129-35 infra. Even where both
factors are not conjunctively necessary for a violation, the purpose with which the practice is
engaged may indicate the true effect of the conduct. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States,
246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). In addition, a nonprohibitive, beneficial intent to promote the legislative
objective of a competitive economy will influence the courts to look favorably on the challenged
practice, despite some currently adverse competitive results. See J. VAN CisE, THE FEDERAL AN-
TITRUST LAWS 24 (3d rev. ed. 1975).
15, The rationale for allowing an anticompetitive effect alone to establish a violation is that
when an interference with competition occurs, it is little comfort that the defendants had other
purposes. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, § 71. A key factor in the evaluation of anticompetitive
effect is the market power of the defendants. See Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Con-
cept." Price Fixing and Market Division (pt. 2), 75 YALE L.L 373, 389-90 (1966). This becomes a
critical issue in the recent application of the rule of reason to price information exchange cases.
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competition. 6 This four-step process is the means by which most chal-
lenged practices are analyzed. However, there are certain pernicious
practices that are, upon identification, presumed to be illegal without
further analysis.' 7 These practices, having a long history of judicial
analysis under the antitrust laws, are said to be subject to the per se
rule, which is an abbreviated version of the rule of reason.'8 The ra-
tionale for this standard is that such a practice, if effective, will nor-
mally cause substantial injury -to competition19 and an inquiry into
16. The rule of reason involves the balancing of various factors to determine if the practice is
an "undue restraint." This standard has been interpreted as relying on competition as the deter-
minative factor in the reasonableness of the restraint. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246
U.S. 231 (1918). A report of the Attorney General's Staff put the issue succinctly: "[The rule of
reason] permits the courts to decide whether conduct is significantly and unreasonably anticompe-
titive in character or effect; it makes obsolete once prevalent arguments, such as whether monop-
oly arrangements would be socially preferable to competition in a particular industry .. " U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAWS 11 (1955).
Justice Brandeis, in the Chicago Board of Trade case, gave the classic formulation of the test
as "whether the restraint imposed. . . promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress
or even destroy competition." 246 U.S. at 238. However, the case itself seems to suggest that a
restraint on competition can be justified by certain social gains resulting from the restraint, such as
the creation of leisure time for commodity traders. Id. at 241. See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v.
United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933). Although the Court has apparently given consideration to
social gains in these cases, it has repeatedly emphasized that arguments attempting to justify a
restraint based upon its value as a social tool "are not reasons that satisfy the Rule." National
Soe'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 694 (1978). But see id. at 699, 700-01,
700 n.* (Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in part). See text accompanying notes 98-99 &
106-10 infra.
Some commentators have argued that alternative social policies should be considered as goals
of the antitrust laws. For example, Professor Bork has advocated consideration of consumer
wealth maximization by measuring total economic efficiency-an approach that would permit, in
some instances, the maintenance of a monopoly or facilitation of an oligopolistic market. See R.
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 41-47 (1978); Bork, supra note 15, (pt. 1), 74 YALE L.J. 775, 829-
35 (1965). This position has also been advanced by Professor Posner. See Posner, The Rule of
Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 15
(1977). Posner states that Justice Brandeis' formulation is unhelpful:
To be told to look to the history, circumstances, purposes and effects of a challenged
restriction is not to be provided with visible criteria of illegality. If Justice Brandeis had
said that the test was whether the restriction was on balance pro- or anti-competitive, this
would at least have excluded criteria unrelated to competitiveness .... Yet arguably
competition should not be the exclusive determinant of an unreasonable restraint of
trade. This formulation would prohibit those restraints that, while reducing competition,
on balance increase efficiency. For example, it would bar a merger that gave the acquir-
ing firm a monoply but, in so doing, reduced the costs of serving the market to such an
extent that the monopoly price after the merger was lower than the competitive market
price had been before it.
Id.
17. Traditional per se violations include price fixing, tying arrangements, group boycotts, and
division of markets. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
18. The per se rule requires only that the practice be identified (or labeled) as belonging to
one of the traditional per se categories in order to be found illegal. See note 15 supra.
19. A purpose and effect analysis is technically employed in the labeling process. See United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221-23 (1940) (a combination formed for the
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whether the particular practice under review will be injurious to com-
petition would necessarily be lengthy, complex, and expensive.2 °
A. The Labeling Process.
In any given case, the decision of the court as to which of the two
standards is applicable will hinge upon an initial determination of the
nature of the price information exchange.2 This constitutes, in es-
sence, a labeling process.22 If, upon initial inspection, the evidence in-
dicates a purpose or effect to set or stabilize prices, then the practice is
labeled "price fixing," and the per se rule is applied. Consequently, the
practice is held to be illegal without further inquiry into its competitive
effects. If the evidence does not support labeling the practice as "price
fixing," then a rule of reason analysis is applied.
A description of this labeling process was given in a recent deci-
sion involving a criminal charge of conspiracy to fix prices, United
purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing prices is illegal per
se). However, the finding of an agreement to fix prices will suffice for a per se price fixing viola-
tion, since "such agreements interfere with the 'freedom of traders, and thereby restrain their
ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment.'" Plymouth Dealers' Ass'n v. United
States, 279 F.2d 128, 132 (9th Cir. 1960) (quoting Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram &
Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951)).
20. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, § 70. When the likely effects of a practice are anticompetitive
and a complete review under the rule of reason would be costly, the so-called judicial efficiency
principle warrants that the practice be termed illegal per se. Id. This conclusive presumption of
unreasonableness follows from the "pernicious effect" of such activity. United States v. Northern
Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
The trial process of an antitrust violation begins with a court determination of whether the
facts presented by the plaintiffs, without sufficient contradiction by the defendants, indicate no
plausible theory demonstrating a substantial capacity for increasing competitive efficiency. If no
acceptable theory is demonstrated, the per se rule is operable; if a plausible theory is stated, the
trial should proceed to a consideration of purpose and effect. Bork, supra note 15, at 388-89.
21. The Socony-Vacuum case, which established the per se doctrine, especially for price
fixing, did not involve a clear cut agreement and thus required some interpretation of the purpose
of the arrangements. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, § 74. However, this labeling analysis is not
confined to price information exchanges and has been applied to other Sherman Act violations.
See Comment, Boycott: A Specific Delfnition Limits the Applicabiliy of a Per Se Rule, 71 Nw. U.L.
REV. 818 (1977).
22. Since purpose is not always evident on the face of a price information exchange, the court
must array and evaluate the evidence in making this preliminary inquiry. This labeling process
has been described as follows:
[A]lthough theperse theory short circuits the exhaustive fact finding required by the rule
of reason, it should not be invoked without at least the minimal indicia of anticompeti-
tive purpose or effect. In this case, preliminary assessment of the industry would have
revealed that the minimal indicia were absent.
Hatley v. American Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646, 653 (5th Cir. 1977) (complaint alleged
section I Sherman Act restraint of trade and section 2 Sherman Act monopolization). See note 20
supra for a discussion of the trial process.
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States v. Continental Group, Inc.23  There the Justice Department
presented incriminating, detailed evidence establishing a conspiracy to
set monopoly-level prices for the consumer bag industry.24 The court's
first step was to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the nature and pur-
pose of the conspiracy,25 whereby it found that the defendants know-
ingly participated in the formation of a conspiracy to fix prices. In so
finding, the court required the government to show "that the overall
objects, aims or goals of the conspiracy were consciously agreed to and
that the defendants knowingly participated in the agreement or con-
spiracy to achieve the agreed upon goals ....
Under this approach, only the purpose27 of the price information
exchange will be considered; there is no indication that any considera-
tion of the likely competitive effects of the practice will be included.
This standard of analysis can be justified by the fact that a preliminary
consideration of the evidence concerning the effects of the practice
would be cumbersome and would sacrifice the judicial efficiency that is
the chief object of the per se rule.28 In short, for price information
exchanges, per se liability will be imposed only when there is an agree-
ment that indicates an unlawful purpose to fix or stabilize prices, that
is, when the practice is labeled as price fixing.29 Absent such an agree-
ment, which essentially requires a conspiracy to violate the Sherman
Act, the labeling process will dictate a more thorough analysis of the
exchange of price information under the rule of reason.
23. 456 F. Supp. 704 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 603 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1979).
24. 456 F. Supp. at 708-14.
25. Id. at 714-15.
26. Id. at 716.
27. In Continental Group, the court stated that proof of specific intent to violate the Sherman
Act is not required. The "knowingly participated" intent only mandates a finding that the defend-
ant "intended the necessary and direct consequences of his acts." Id. The Gypsum Court limited
this requirement solely to criminal violation cases also evidencing a harmful effect. 438 U.S. at
444-45. In civil violation cases, the appropriate intent remains an unlawful purpose. See notes
129-35 infra and accompanying text.
28. An exception to the review of purpose only came in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773 (1975). In Goldfarb, the Court did not decide whether the attorney fee schedule consti-
tuted a per se violation until after it had discussed the deleterious effect of the schedule; in "re-
straining competition and harming consumers," the fee schedule was found "unusually
damaging." Id. at 782. However, it is quite likely that this greater preliminary showing was not
imposed upon the plaintiff because of the nature of the exchange of price information, but rather
because the defendants were professional associations. See Note, The Antitrust Liability of Profes-
sionalAssociations After Goldfarb: Reformulating the Learned Professions Exemption in the Lower
Courts, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1047, 1049-50.
29. A great deal of confusion followed United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969),
as both courts and commentators were uncertain whether a per se standard or a rule of reason test
had been applied by the Court. See notes 55, 59, 86 & 88 infra and text accompanying notes 55-59
& 86-88 infra.
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B. Viewing the Rule of Reason in the Price Information Exchange
Context.
The rule of reason extends the scope of analysis to cover evidence
concerning the actual competitive effect of the practice. In order ade-
quately to determine whether an exchange of price information is, on
balance, procompetitive or anticompetitive, it is necessary to assess the
market conditions in which the exchange has occurred.
1. The Underlying Economic Theory. Where a market is composed
of many small competitors purveying a homogeneous product, each
seller is, theoretically, powerless to affect the price of the product since
demand is assumed to be infinitely elastic. 30 This assumption of perfect
competition, in turn, rests upon the assumption that each market par-
ticipant possesses "perfect knowledge of the relevant economic and
technological data. ' '3 ' Of course, information is not costless, and no
market exists where all participants can freely obtain complete knowl-
edge of all the relevant figures. Under an antitrust policy that seeks to
foster competition, it is clear that in markets consisting of many sellers
with identical products, the exchange of price information will serve to
effectuate the policy of fostering competition.
Price information exchange may have an adverse effect 32 in mar-
kets that are more concentrated and interdependent. In an oligopolistic
industry, participants will possess a sufficient share of the market to be
able to influence the price of the product,3 3 creating interdependence
and sensitivity to each other's actions in the pricing decision. While
any firm individually could gain from a reduction in price through the
30. E. MANSFIELD, supra note 4, at 103-05, 234-35; G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 87-91
(3d ed. 1966).
31. E. MANSFIELD, supra note 4, at 235. In addition to the conditions of homogeneity of
product, sellers small relative to the entire market, and perfect information, perfect competition
also requires that all resources be completely mobile. Id. In the long run, perfect competition
cannot be maintained if there are barriers to entry to the market to new firms, either in the form of
large initial capital investments or possession of essential resources or technological knowledge.
See W. SHEPHERD, THE TREATMENT OF MARKET POWER; ANTITRUST, REGULATION AND PUBLIC
ENTERPRISE 45-50 (1975).
32. See notes 45-53 infra and accompanying text. Container Corp. was a recognition of the
potential adverse effect.
33. See E. MANSFIELD, supra note 4, at 303-09. This interdependence can result from several
factors, including small numbers, high fixed costs, barriers to entry, excess capacity, inelastic de-
mand for the products of the industry, and high cross-elasticities within the market. D. O'BRIEN
& D. SWANN, INFORMATION AGREEMENTS, COMPETITION AND EFFICIENCY 117 (1969).
However, mere similarity in sales prices is not indicative of any price fixing. This would be a
condition found in any market, perfectly competitive or highly concentrated, that was in equilib-
rium. The courts have recognized this situation and disregard evidence of comparable prices. See
Bendix Corp. v. Balax, Inc., 471 F.2d 149, 160 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 819 (1973).
34. D. O'BRIEN & D. SWANN, supra note 33, at 115.
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increased demand that reduction brings, the interests of all firms as a
group will be to avoid any active price competition." This principle
derives from the awareness of all oligopolists of their interdepen-
dence,3 6 which encourages coordination of their activities. The thrust
of the antitrust laws has always been to prevent this collusion when it is
manifested in an explicit agreement. In the case of an extremely con-
centrated market, a price information exchange system lends itself to
the avoidance of all price competition, and hence, even in the absence
of a specific agreement to fix prices, to de facto price stabilization.
2. The Historical Rule of Reason in Price Information Exchange
Cases. In view of the importance of economic data on markets in un-
derstanding the effect of a price information exchange system, the rule
of reason as developed by the Supreme Court has been an inadequate
measure of the effect upon competition. In American Column & Lumber
Co. v. United States,37 the initial decision of the Supreme Court con-
cerning the validity of a price information exchange, the Court used the
rule of reason to invalidate a trade association program that provided
for the daily reporting of prices.38 By emphasizing the frequency and
currency of the information dissemination program, the Court left the
obvious implication that some forms of price information exchange
would be permissible under the Sherman Act. Shortly thereafter, the
Supreme Court did sustain inter-seller price exchange practices in two
cases, Maple Flooring Manufacturers Association v. United States,39 and
Cement Manufacturers Protective Association v. United States.4" In
both cases the Court employed a purpose and effect rule of reason anal-
ysis4' that emphasized the particulars of the trade association plan of
35. The presence of an oligopolistic industry does not ensure price fixing since "noncompeti-
tive pricing by oligopolists is not compelled, although it is facilitated, by the structure of the mar-
ket." Posner, sufpra note 13, at 1605. There are several valid reasons for actively engaging in price
reductions in a concentrated industry. See note 160 infra.
36. D. O'BRIEN & D. SWANN, supra note 33, at 110-17; F. SCHERER, upra note 4, at 157.
37. 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
38. American Column & Lumber involved a hardwood trade association that constituted 33%
of the total industry. The Court invalidated a plan that included the exchange of a voluminous
amount of general industry data in addition to the reporting of current prices. Id. at 394-99, 411.
See also United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923) (a case involving a
similar plan).
39. 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
40. 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
41. Since no specific agreement to fix prices was found under the labeling process in either
case, the rule of reason was invoked to determine whether the exchange of price information was
unreasonable. In Maple Flooring, despite a finding by the trial court that such activity had the
tendency to destroy competition, the Court ruled that certain characteristics of the program sup-
ported the inference that the dissemination was not an undue restraint of competition. 268 U.S. at
575, 582. The trade association, which produced almost 70% of the output of the industry, dissem-
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dissemination of price and other data.
By focusing upon the particular details of the program, this early
line of cases used the rule of reason to create a checklist by which lower
courts were to judge the competitive effect of price information ex-
changes.4 2 To find a violation of the Sherman Act under this applica-
tion of the rule of reason, the courts had to find program details that
could facilitate de facto price fixing, such as exchanges of current price
information and evidence of significant price stabilization.4 3 The eco-
nomic consequences of the exchange of price information within the
particular industry structure were given no consideration in the deter-
mination of whether an anticompetitive effect was a likely result.44 In
inated price information, freight rates, average costs, and quantities sold. Nonetheless, the Court
upheld this program, noting that the data dealt only with past transactions, the parties to specific
transactions were not identified, and most of the information was available to the public as well.
Id. at 582-86.
Similarly, the Cement Mfrs. decision relied on certain details of the trade association infor-
mation exchange plan to support the view that the dissemination practice was not anticompetitive.
Although the Court gave no indication of the relative size of the trade association to the total
market, the elements of the program found to be indicative of the reasonableness of the restraint
on trade were, first, that no commitment was made to comply with published prices, second, that
individual transactions were not identified, and finally, that information was disseminated to all
buyers. 268 U.S. at 602-06. Accord, Tag Mfrs. Inst. v. FTC, 174 F.2d 452 (1st Cir. 1949).
The Court in Cement Mfrs. also provided an alternative ground for upholding the associa-
tion's verification of price based upon the indication of fraud by cement purchasers in reporting
competitors' prices. 268 U.S. at 603-04. See Note, Price Veriftcation Under Robinson-Patman." The
Creation 0/an Unnecessary "Controlling Circumstance" 58 B.U. L. REV. 127, 132-33 (1978). This
led to the creation of a partial exemption from Sherman Act liability. See notes 65-76 & 136-54
ib/ra and accompanying text.
42. See Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936), as another example of price
data dissemination by a trade group. There the members agreed all sales should be publicly
announced and made at open prices. The practice was found not to violate the Sherman Act,
since the program essentially followed the checklist of approved elements established by Maple
Flooring. Id. at 597-98.
43. See, e.g., Salt Producers Ass'n v. FTC, 134 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1943).
44. The early decisions almost blindly ignored the actual or potential impact of market struc-
ture. In American Column & Lumber, the members of the trade association controlled only 33% of
the industry. This may have been less than the market power necessary to create a potential
danger of price stabilization. Nevertheless, the dissemination of data was found to be a violation
of the Sherman Act without discussion of market power. The trade association required all mem-
bers to (I) estimate production for the next two months, (2) indicate whether a plant shutdown
was likely, and (3) state the firm's outlook on the general market conditions. 257 U.S. at 394-98.
While the Court said this constituted coordination and led to a rise in market prices, it totally
disregarded any probability that this communication had led the industry to the level of prices
that would have prevailed with perfect competition. R. POSNER 137-42.
By contrast, the defendants in Maple Flooring controlled 70% of their market, 268 U.S. at 566,
and the defendants in Sugar Institute possessed a 70-80% market share. 297 U.S. at 572. Yet, even
with the presence of a large market share, the Court did not consider the potential inference of
collusion in either case, R. POSNER 142. The obvious potential for price stabilization or collusion
that exists in a concentrated market was not addressed by the Supreme Court, as the exchange of
price information was allowed to continue in each instance.
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addition, the emphasis of both the courts and the enforcing agencies
was upon formal trade association arrangements to exchange price in-
formation, and did not extend to informal arrangements that may have
achieved the same end.
3. United States v. Container Corp. Critical consideration of the
relevant market structure in assessing the competitive impact of an ex-
change of price information, as well as recognition that an informal
exchange of price data can stabilize prices, was at last incorporated into
the rule of reason by the Supreme Court in United States v. Container
Corp- 4 5 That case did not involve a formal trade association agreement
to publish price lists and other data. The defendants had agreed only
to exchange information about the most recent price charged or quoted
to individual customers, when asked by a competitor, with an expecta-
tion of reciprocity. In finding a section 1 violation, the Court gave con-
siderable weight to the market structure of the industry in question.4 6
The implication of this decision was that in applying the rule of
reason, the courts must consider, in addition to the details of the price
information exchange practice being challenged, the market structure
and relevant elasticities of the industry. However, Container Corp. left
a great deal of confusion over whether the Court applied a per se or
rule of reason standard.47 This ambiguity resulted from a reference in
the majority opinion of Justice Douglas to the use of the per se rule for
interferences with the setting of price by free market forces. 8 Although
several commentators argued that a per se standard was enforced be-
45. 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
46. Defendants were 18 manufacturers of corrugated containers who were responsible for
approximately 90% of the shipments of such containers in the southeastern United States. Id. at
336. In finding that the exchange of price information tended to stabilize prices at a downward
level, id., the Court recognized that the structure of the market facilitated this result, but that it
might not in other markets:
Price information exchanged in some markets may have no effect on a truly competitive
price. But the corrugated container industry is dominated by relatively few sellers. The
product is fungible and the competition for sales is price. The demand is inelastic, as
buyers only place orders for immediate, short-run needs. The exchange of price data
tends towards price uniformity.
Id. at 337.
47. See text accompanying notes 56-64 infra for a discussion of the confusion in lower courts
on whether Container Corp. applied a per se standard.
48. 393 U.S. at 337. The reference in question also cited United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), which imposed per se liability. However, the concurrence by Justice
Fortas stressed that only a rule of reason standard was being applied. 393 U.S. at 338-40 (Fortas,
1., concurring). An alternative reading of this language, expressing the idea that a "free market"
does not exclude all information-sharing among competitors, would indicate that the court was
merely stressing that such sharing of price information may be prohibited where market condi-
tions are favorable to collusive behavior. R. POSNER 144-45.
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cause of the novel approach concerning industry structure and the pre-
cedent cited,49 subsequent interpretation has revealed that a rule of
reason approach to exchanges of price information is necessary.50 The
importance of Container Corp. is that it expanded the scope of inquiry
by the courts under the rule of reason from the mere consideration of
the details of the exchange of information to include the relevant eco-
nomic characteristics of the industry structure. Thus, Container Corp.
was a recognition that the impact of exchanges of price information
will vary depending upon the market in which the exchanges take
place t.5
Few industries fit smoothly into the theoretical constructs of pure
competition or a highly concentrated oligopoly. Firms within an indus-
try may differ by size, product, cost structure, and other factors placing
the market somewhere between these two poles of analysis. 51 Precisely
for this reason, the rule of reason, rather than a per se rule, should be
applied in price information exchange cases, provided no explicit price-
fixing agreement is discovered. Under the rule of reason, the litigants
should be given the opportunity to introduce evidence of the relevant
market structure,53 which might indicate the propensity of a price in-
49. See 16J J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 11, §§ 77.02[2][a]-[b]; Monroe, PracticalAntitrust
Considerationsfor Trade Associations, 1969 UTAH L. REv. 622, 626 n.24; Note, Antitrust Liability
for an Exchange of Price Information- What Happened to Container Corporation?, 63 VA. L.
REv. 639, 654 (1977); Note, Guidelines for Data Dissemination Through Trade Associations, 10
WASHBURN L.J. 93, 102 (1970). Contra, Kefauver, The Legality of Dissemination of Market Data
by Trade Associations: Mhat Does Container Hold 57 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 791 (1972); Note,
Antitrust Implications of the Exchange of Price Information Among Competitors: The Container
Corporation Case, 68 MICH. L. REV. 720, 737 (1970).
50. Gypsum clearly indicates that the per se rule is inappropriate to exchanges of price infor-
mation. 438 U.S. at 441 n.16. Apparently, the Justice Department itself did not view Container
Corp. as utilizing a per se standard. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE PRICING AND MARKETING OF
INSURANCE 111 (1977). However, many lower court cases did not interpret Container Corp. in this
manner. See text accompanying notes 56-64 infra.
51. .See notes 30-36 supra and accompanying text. See Note, 63 VA. L. REv., supra note 49,
at 656. Container Corp. was cited by the Fifth Circuit in Gainesville Utils. Dep't v. Florida Power
& Light Co., 573 F.2d 292 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 966 (1978). The Fifth Circuit's opinion
declared that the "Supreme Court, in determining if the exchange of price information was illegal,
has considered whether an industry was 'dominated by relatively few sellers.'" 573 F.2d at 303.
52. See generally E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (8th ed.
1962).
53. Professor Richard A. Posner has suggested a two-stage inquiry under this rule of reason
test: first, identify those markets in which conditions are favorable for collusion, and second,
determine whether collusive pricing exists in fact. R. POSNER 55.
Under the first stage of inquiry, Posner would focus attention upon a list of conditions that
facilitate collusion (that is, represent indicators of those markets where collusion would be very
possible). These factors include the following: a concentrated market on the selling side (mea-
sured by the aggregate share of the four to eight largest firms); no fringe of small sellers that would
constitute a limitation on the power of the colluding sellers over market price; an inelastic demand
at a competitive price; strong barriers to entry; low concentration on the buying side, as this gives
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formation exchange to restrict price competition, particularly in view of
any actual effect on the market. The rule proposed by Container Corp.
is to infer an actual agreement to fix prices from a price information
exchange in a particularly collusive market structure. A simultaneous
finding of actual, anticompetitive harm to prices would produce a Sher-
man Act violation. This is not a departure from the previous emphasis
on competition, which would allow arguments stressing countervailing
social gains to be considered as well,5 4 but a recognition that a rule of
reason standard must scrutinize all critical economic factors if a judg-
ment on competitive effect is to be made.
4. Ignoring the Insight of Container Corp. Following Container
Corp., several lower court rulings attempted to interpret and follow its
directives concerning price information exchanges. In most of these
cases, however, the courts ignored the market power of the defendants
and the market structure of the industry. Rather than inferring agree-
ment from the concentration of the market controlled by the defend-
ants as the Court did in Container Corp., they sought instead to find an
illegal purpose evidenced by an agreement.5 -
the sellers more power to collude in their negotiation; a standardized product that would make
price the most critical form of competition; and the industry's antitrust "record." Id. 55-62. See
also D. O'BRIEN & D. SWANN, supra note 33, at 115-17. The second stage looks for evidence of
actual collusive behavior. If it is found that the market structure is favorable to collusion, Posner
concludes that exchanges of price information will be strong evidence of price fixing. R. POSNER
65-66, 147. For a viewpoint that this two-stage analysis cannot be implemented, see Scherer, The
Posnerian Harvest: Separating 1f"eatfrom Chaff, 86 YALE L.J. 974, 982-83 (1977) (reviewing R.
POSNER). For the view that economic evidence can be used to identify likely markets for collusion
and to determine whether such collusion has taken place, see Calvani, Mr. Posner's Blueprint for
Reforming the Antitrust Laws, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1311, 1316-18 (1977) (reviewing R. POSNER).
Price information is not always distributed through trade associations or even by loosely
organized agreements for infrequent price verification. If the first-stage inquiry reveals a propen-
sity for collusive behavior (that is, a highly concentrated market), then evidence of price leader-
ship may indicate a communication of prices among competitors yielding price stabilization. See
generally F. SCHERER, supra note 4, at 164-73.
Price leadership within an industry may serve pro-competitive purposes by communicating
valuable information that can lead an industry to a competitive equilibrium; however, where the
industry is shown under a second-stage analysis to provide the principal firms with a considerable
amount of pricing discretion, and where all members recognize their common interest in pricing,
collusive price leadership is possible. Id. 166.
54. See note 16 supra.
55. See, e.g., Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1359-60 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1074 (1977); Treasure Valley Potato Bargaining Ass'n v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 497 F.2d
203, 208-09 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 999 (1974); Gray v. Shell Oil Co., 469 F.2d 742, 747
(9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 943 (1973); Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175, 182 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1972); Webster v. Sinclair, Ref. Co., 338 F. Supp. 248, 251-52
(S.D. Ala. 1971); Wall Prods. Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 326 F. Supp. 295, 315-16 (N.D. Cal.
1971); Di-Wal Inc. v. Fibreboard Corp., 1970 Trade Cas. 73,155, at 88,554, 88,556 (N.D. Cal.
1970).
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This misunderstanding is partially attributable to the uncertainty
of the lower courts as to whether Container Corp. imposed a per se
standard on price information exchanges in a concentrated market. In
Gray v. Shell Oil Co. ,S6 seven oil companies, controlling approximately
eighty percent of the Western market, exchanged price information, al-
though not under any systematic agreement, to determine whether to
provide financial support for service station dealers engaged in gasoline
price wars. The court interpreted Container Corp. as mandating a per
se standard,57 and therefore engaged in a labeling process effort to find
a conspiracy to fix prices. No unlawful purpose was discovered and
Container Corp. was distinguished ai involving a specific agreement to
exchange information. 8 Confusion over the test used in Container
Corp. led the court to search for an actual agreement to fix prices, and
to ignore the importance of the holding in Container Corp. that certain
market conditions themselves may support an inference of an agree-
ment to restrain price competition.5 9
Even the Supreme Court has failed to follow the Container Corp.
decision consistently. In United States v. Citizens & Southern National
Bank,60 the defendants operated separately incorporated banks as de
facto branches to avoid a Georgia restriction against branch banking,
and in so doing, exchanged information among branches concerning
prices, interest rates, and services. The Court attempted to clarify the
standard applied in Container Corp. by stating that "the dissemination
of price information is not itself a per se violation of the Sherman
Act"" and by citing Justice Fortas' concurring opinion in Container
Corp., which argued that a per se standard was not intended for that
case.62 Nonetheless, the Court did not examine the relevant market
structure, even though the trial court had found that the exchange did
contribute to a "lack of significant price competition."63 However, Citi-
56. 469 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 943 (1973).
57. 469 F.2d at 746-47.
58. Id.
59. See Note, 63 VA. L. REv., supra note 49, at 657-61. Gray v. Shell Oil Co., 469 F.2d 742
(9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 943 (1973), is typical of other lower court rulings that mis-
interpreted Container Corp. See Treasure Valley Potato Bargaining Ass'n v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc.,
497 F.2d 203 (9th Cir.) (potato bargaining association claimed seller's trade association conspired
to fix prices; court ruled no agreement could be found, even though seller's trade association
controlled the market, and distinguished Container Corp. as involving a specific agreement), cert
denied, 419 U.S. 999 (1974); Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175 (10th Cir.) (court distinguished
Container Corp. on the particulars of the practice involved, employing an analysis similar to that
used in early Supreme Court decisions), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1972).
60. 422 U.S. 86 (1975).
61. Id. at 113.
62. Id. See notes 47-50 supra and accompanying text.
63. 422 U.S. at 114.
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zens & Southern need not necessarily be interpreted as a rejection of
the Container Corp. extension of the rule of reason standard, since the
opinion seemed to limit the case to its own peculiar facts.64
C. Lower Court Interpretation: The Creation of an Exception.
An important development in the lower court rulings subsequent
to Container Corp. was the creation of an exception to Sherman Act
liability for interseller price verification. Justice Douglas, in Container
Corp., referred to the fraud exception of Cement Manufacturers65 as a
"controlling circumstance" in the exchange of prices to specific custom-
ers,66 but made absolutely no mention of the Robinson-Patman Act
section 2(b) "meeting competition" defense.6" Subsequently, in Wall
Products v. National Gypsum Co.,68 the district court read the "control-
ling circumstances" language of Container Corp. and then combined
the Cement Manufacturers buyer fraud exception with interseller price
verification under section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act to create a
broad exception to Sherman Act liability.69 This exception disregarded
any anticompetitive effect of price verification, and relied, upon the
good faith of the seller.70 The attempt to comply with the Robinson-
Patman Act provisions was held to be a valid purpose, similar to that in
Cement Manufacturers, and subject to similar exception.7' This excep-
tion was thereafter recognized by several other lower courts.72 Conse-
64. Essentially, the Supreme Court found that the Georgia restriction against branch banking
was itself an anticompetitive restraint, as it amounted to a compulsory market division. Id. at 118.
In regard to the practice of the defendants, the Court stated: "By providing new banking options
to suburban Atlanta customers, while eliminating no existing options, the defacto branching pro-
gram of [Citizens and Southern] has plainly been pro-competitive." Id. at 119. See Note, 63 VA.
L. REv., supra note 49, at 659.
65. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
66. 393 U.S. at 335.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976).
68. 326 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
69. Id. at 312-14. The exception was stated very broadly:
From this language, it is clear that in Cement Mfrs. the Supreme Court held lawful, and
not in violation of the Sherman Act, an exchange between sellers of price information
relating to specific customers, even under circumstances amounting to an agreement, where
the purpose of the exchange was to safeguard against fraud and deception, and even
though prices might be affected thereby.
Id. at 314 (emphasis in original).
70. The concept of a "good faith" attempt comes directly from the act itself, 15 U.S.C.
§ 13(b)(1976). However, the availability of the defense is judged in terms of reasonable belief.
FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 759-60 (1945). See text accompanying notes 146-50
infra.
71. 326 F. Supp. at 314.
72. See, e.g., Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175 (10th Cir.) (defendants found to have
complied with "good faith" defense), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1972); Webster v. Sinclair Ref.
Co., 338 F. Supp. 248 (S.D. Ala. 1971) (defendants found to comply with Robinson-Patman Act
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quently, the rule of reason was eliminated entirely at times, as the scope
of the inquiry was limited under the labeling process to a search for
compliance with the Robinson-Patman Act.
The application of this standard totally undermined the Container
Corp. approach by allowing an exception for any program of price ver-
ification so long as it complied with the "good faith meeting competi-
tion" defense. The complete disregard for competitive effects,
particularly given an interdependent market, will often lead to an-
ticompetitive results.73  Other criticisms of the "controlling circum-
stances" exception are that (1) the extension of the Cement
Manufacturers fraud exception was unwarranted,74 (2) the good faith
requirement is overinclusive,75 and (3) the need for interseller price
verification for a "controlling circumstance" exception has not been
substantiated. 76  The creation of this exception provided the back-
ground for the Gypsum decision, but a different exception involving the
learned professions reached the Supreme Court first and laid the
framework for the Court's treatment of price information exchange.
and therefore fell within the exemption); Di-Wal, Inc. v. Fibreboard Corp., 1970 Trade Cas.
73,155 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (defendants within the good faith defense).
73. In an oligopolistic market, if sellers can ascertain the prices charged by their competitors,
especially under a price verification plan, price diversity and market competition can be avoided.
This lessens downward pressure on prices. No explicit agreement to collude upon prices is neces-
sary in a concentrated market with price verification; tacit collusion will suffice. See, e.g., Wall
Prods. Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 326 F. Supp. 295, 316 (N.D. Cal. 1971); R. POSNER 71-73 &
n.5 1. See notes 30-36 supra and accompanying text.
74. Cement Manufacturers involved a post-contract verification, while the "controlling cir-
cumstances" cases involve pre-contract verifications. Pre-contract verification creates a greater
possibility of price collusion. See Note, supra note 41, at 136-37. More importantly, Container
Corp. did not expand the narrow holding of Cement Manufacturers. Note, Price Information Ex-
changes May Be Justfied Despite Antiompetitive Effects, 50 TEx. L. REv. 369, 372 (1972).
75. To meet a good faith requirement, a seller should exercise all diligence to ascertain the
veracity of a reported price, without consulting a competitor for verification. Good faith can be
established short of actual interseller communication. When good faith is established, a seller can
lower his prices to meet the competition. Note, 50 TEX. L. REv., supra note 74, at 373-74. See
Note, supra note 41, at 144-45.
In an oligopoly, buyers are quite often unreliable. Nonetheless, good faith in such circum-
stances has been argued to require only proof of the buyer's reputation in reporting prices and not
verification of the reported price with the other seller. Id. 146-47. Section 2(f) of the Robinson-
Patman Act imposes liability on buyers who knowingly induce or receive a price discrimination.
15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1976). This section is receiving increased attention. See notes 137 & 151 infra.
76. The Robinson-Patman Act does grant a substantive right for a seller to meet competition,
but good faith compliance must be proven in court. Any seller claiming the protection of the
exception should have to introduce substantial evidence of consistent victimization by customer
fraud and show that interseller price verification was the only pragmatic resolution to the prob-
lem. See Kefauver, supra note 49, at 791.
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II. ELIMINATION OF THE LEARNED PROFESSIONS EXEMPTION-
EFFECT ON THE STANDARD OF ANALYSIS FOR PRICE
INFORMATION EXCHANGES
Professional associations, by virtue of their public service and so-
cial status, were thought to be protected from liability under the Sher-
man Act by the so-called "learned professions exemption."71
Consequently, it was the practice of professional organizations to dis-
tribute advisory fee schedules openly among their members as well as
to promulgate ethical norms concerning competitive practices. In
many respects, the learned professions engaged in the exchange of price
information or in closely analogous activities.
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have looked behind the
protective veil of the learned professions exemption and have imposed
Sherman Act liability upon professional organizations. This trend
would seem to indicate that price information exchanges involving pro-
fessional associations should be analyzed under the extended rule of
reason employed in Container Corp.78 However, despite the previous
protection accorded the learned professions, price information ex-
change has recently been subjected to a more restricted analysis.
A. Goldfarb: End of an Absolute Learned Professions Exemption.
The unlimited exemption from antitrust policing that the learned
professions had long enjoyed was renounced by the Supreme Court in
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.79 In that case, a class action suit was
brought against the state and county bar associations on a claim of
price fixing in violation of the Sherman Act. The claimants had unsuc-
cessfully tried to find an attorney who would perform a title examina-
tion for less than the fee prescribed in a minimum fee schedule
published by the county bar. After eliminating several obstacles that
would have prevented the suit, 0 the Supreme Court held that the fee
schedules constituted a price-fixing violation, since they were not purely
advisory but rather established a rigid price floor.8"
77. See Levin v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 233 F. Supp. 953 (D.D.C. 1964), rev'don other grounds,
354 F.2d 515 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
78. See notes 45-54 supra and accompanying text.
79. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
80. The Supreme Court found (1) that the interstate commerce requirement was satisfied,
since a significant amount of the funds furnished for financing the purchase of homes came from
outside the state and title examination was an essential part of this process, (2) that a title exami-
nation is a service that constitutes "commerce," and (3) that no "state action" exemption applied
to the bar associations since their activities were not compelled by the authority of the state acting
as sovereign. Id. at 783-92.
81. Id. at 781-83. This left open the question of the status of a purely advisory fee schedule,
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While the Container Corp. case concerned "an agreement that may
be inferred from an exchange of price information,"8 2 the fee schedule
in Goldfarb was a "naked agreement . . . [whose] effect on prices is
plain."83 However, before declaring the fee schedule to be "a classic
illustration of price fixing,"8 4 the Court went beyond looking for the
predictable effect of the activity and discussed the actual effect of "re-
straining competition and harming consumers.""5 While no elaborate
study was conducted, the Court in essence incorporated a rule of reason
into the labeling process.8 6
This extension of the labeling process to include a balancing ap-
proach was most likely intended by the Court to be limited to learned
professions exemption cases.8 7 Footnote seventeen of Goldfarb states
that some acts by professional organizations may not be Sherman Act
violations though they could be found to be violations in a different
context. 88 By indicating that the learned professions exemption contin-
ued to exist in some form, and by extending the scope of the labeling
process, the Goldfarb Court seemed to be indicating that price informa-
tion exchanges might still find some extra protection in the learned pro-
fessions exemption and would therefore receive a more full-blown
which the Court declined to answer. Id. at 781. Presumably, it would be considered under the
rule of reason in a manner similar to any price information exchange. This was indicated by the
Court's reference to the American Column and Maple Flooring cases.
82. Id. at 782.
83. Id. (footnote omitted).
84. 'Id. at 783.
85. Id. at 782.
86. See notes 21, 22, 27, & 28 supra and text accompanying notes 21-29 supra for discussion
of the labeling process. See Martyn, Lawyer Advertising The Unique Relationshp Between First
Amendment and Antitrust Protections, 23 WAYNE L. REV. 167, 181-83 (1976), for the proposition
that Goldfarb applied an "across the board" rule of reason test. But see Branca & Steinberg,
Attarney Fee Schedules andLegalAdertising: The Implications ofGoldfarb, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
475 (1977). The authors suggest that competitive market restraints of learned professions do not
have greater justification to counterbalance inhibition of competition and therefore should not
merit full consideration under the rule of reason. "IT]he question to be considered under the rule
of reason is whether the public benefit from the enforcement of the present prohibitions against
attorney advertising and solicitation is outweighed by the resulting competitive harm .... An
examination of these [public benefit] justifications, however, reveals that the restraints are either
unlikely or unnecessary to achieve their purported goals." Id. at 509-10.
87. See Note, supra note 28, at 1050.
88. 421 U.S. at 788-89 n.17. The footnote reads in full:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a business
is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint violates the Sher-
man Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable
with other business activities, and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust con-
cepts which originated in other areas. The public service aspect, and other features of
the professions, may require that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed
as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently. We intimate
no view on any other situation than the one with which we are confronted today.
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analysis. However, Goldfarb itself gave no further explanation of the
distinctive treatment given learned professions.8 9
B. Non-Price-Fixing Violations by the Learned Professions.
Goldfarb's ambiguous treatment of the learned professions exemp-
tion led the lower courts to consider a subsequent Supreme Court deci-
sion concerning the state action exemption,90 Cantor v. Detroit Edison
Co."9 In Cantor, private retailers challenged a private utility's practice
of supplying free light bulbs to its residential customers. The utility
claimed exemption from Sherman Act liability because the practice
had been approved by the Michigan Public Service Commission, the
state regulator of utilities. However, the utility was held not to be ex-
empt because state action is limited to action by a state official 92 and,
subsequently, the practice was held to be in violation of the Sherman
Act. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did recognize a further excep-
tion to Sherman Act coverage. This limited exemption extends to a
state regulatory standard protecting the public interest whenever it con-
flicts with the competitive standard imposed by the antitrust laws.93
Relying upon this Cantor exemption, the Ninth Circuit adopted a
similar public interest exemption for the learned professions in Bod-
dicker v. Arizona State Dental Association.94 In Boddicker, an action
was brought by licensed dentists against the state dental association al-
leging that an anticompetitive tying arrangement in violation of the
Sherman Act resulted from an agreement to require membership in the
national dental association before one could be a member and partici-
pate in the local dental associations. Though a tying arrangement is
characteristically a per se violation,95 the Court concluded that a pro-
fession will not be liable provided the "particular practice, rule or regu-
lation of a profession, whether rooted in tradition or the
pronouncements of its organizations, [serves] the purpose for which the
profession exists, viz. to serve the public. That is, it must contribute
directly to improving service to the public." 96
Not only did the court fail to apply a per se standard to a practice
89. For a list of possible interpretations, see Note, supra note 28, at 1056.
90. Id. 1052-55.
91. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
92. Id. at 589-91.
93. Id. at 597.
94. 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1978).
95. See Former Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969) (Fortner
J); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
96. 549 F.2d at 632. This could be interpreted as following the standard advocated by Pro-
fessor Bork on consumer welfare maximization. See R. BoRK, supra note 16, at 81-89.
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generally accorded such scrutiny, but it also took a more expansive
view of possible justifications for the practice. Boddicker indicates that,
as compared with other business, learned professions will be accorded a
greater opportunity to demonstrate the beneficial effect of their prac-
tices on competition and the public interest by removing the normal
per se rule and substituting a rule of reason test.
Taken together, Goldfarb and Boddicker suggest that alleged anti-
trust violations will receive more extensive analysis in the context of the
learned professions, either through an extended labeling process as sug-
gested in Goldfarb, or through a greater range of factors considered
under the rule of reason as suggested in Boddicker. This further indi-
cates that the Container Corp. "market structure" rule of reason will be
applied to professional price information exchanges that do not consti-
tute price fixing. However, the fact that the Boddicker court was will-
ing to consider more factors in the context of a tying arrangement than
were considered by the Goldfarb Court in the context of price fixing
was an early indication that courts would treat price information ex-
changes in general more strictly than other alleged offenses. This was
soon confirmed in the Supreme Court's next major learned professions
exemption decision.
C. National Society of Professional Engineers.
The Supreme Court gave the learned professions exemption its
most thorough examination in National Society of Professional Engi-
neers v. United States.9" Section 1l(c) of the Canon of Ethics of the
National Society of Professional Engineers prohibited competitive bid-
ding by its members. They were not to discuss the fee to be charged a
client until after the prospective client had selected the engineer for a
particular project. If a prospective client demanded disclosure of fees
as a precondition to a contract, the canon dictated that the engineer
withdraw from consideration for that job. The Justice Department
sought an injunction against enforcement of the canon, alleging that its
observance violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. The society put
forth a Boddicker-type public benefit argument, claiming that the ca-
non was reasonable since competitive bidding would adversely affect
the quality of engineering, thereby creating a danger to public health,
safety, and welfare.99
Although the prohibition against bidding was not an exchange of
97. See Branea & Steinberg, supra note 86, at 507-09; Note, supra note 28, at 1060-61.
98. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
99. Id. at 684-85.
1022 [Vol. 1979:1004
SEPARATE RULE OF REASON
price information, the alleged effect was identical, since it suppressed
price competition among the members of the society. 00 Therefore, the
same issue confronted the Court as in a price information exchange
context: that is, whether a practice among competitors that concerned
the price charged to purchasers operated to suppress price competition
and thereby to stabilize prices in the industry. This case invited the
Court to test the two considerations isolated by Goldfarb and Boddick-
er: the distinction between price-related and non-price-related viola-
tions of the Sherman Act and the public benefit defense under the
learned professions exemption.
1. Ending an Exemption or Forcing Price Competition? In re-
jecting the society's public benefit argument, the Supreme Court found
the canon to be an unreasonable restraint on competition. While the
Court stressed that it was evaluating the ban on competitive bidding
under the rule of reason, it nevertheless declared that "an agreement
that 'interfere[s] with the setting of price by market forces' is illegal on
its face. . . [and that] [wihile [the ban on competitive bidding] . . . is
not price fixing as such, no elaborate industry analysis is required to
demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an agreement."10'
If, as the Court claimed, the agreement was illegal on its face, it is un-
clear why the Court professed to invoke the rule of reason, particularly
in view of its statement that a per se violation applies to "agreements
whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no
elaborate study of the industry is needed."'10 2
Given that the Canon of Ethics was not an agreement to fix prices
charged by competitors, it does appear that the rule of reason was the
proper standard to apply. Society of Professional Engineers defined the
rule of reason to be the correct test for "agreements whose competitive
effect can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar to the busi-
ness, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was im-
posed."'0 3 The opinion is devoid of an "elaborate study" of the
industry, and the Court found the ban on competitive bidding illegal
under a rule of reason test that was limited to an analysis of the predict-
able effects of the ban, without any specific finding of a stabilization
of prices. 104 This was in actuality no more than a labeling pro-
100. Id. at 684.
101. Id. at 692.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. The district court did find that the ban impeded "the ordinary give and take of the mar-
ket place, [depriving the customer of] the ability to utilize and compare prices in selecting engi-
neering services." Id. at 692-93 (quoting 404 F. Supp. at 460). This is not so much a finding of an
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cess, i0 5 identical in substance to that used in the context of price fixing
by the Goldfarb Court. The clear implication is that any restraint on
price competition will be viewed with a jaundiced eye, and will receive
either per se or very truncated rule of reason analysis.
Society of Professional Engineers does cite the footnote in Gold-
farb 0 6 as recognizing that "professional services may differ signifi-
cantly from other business services, and, accordingly, [that] the nature
of the competition in such services may vary."' 10 7 However, the Court
remained steadfast in adhering to the "suppress or promote" competi-
tion standard, overruling the society's attempted public benefit justifi-
cation, and finding the restriction on competitive bidding to be in direct
contravention of the Sherman Act policy on competition.10 8
Society of Professional Engineers, on its face, indicates that the
learned professions exemption is all but eliminated despite Boddicker's
intimation that a learned profession's practice may be justified by a
showing of public benefit. 0 9 However, the ruling is not quite that
broad. When read in conjunction with Goldfarb and Cantor, the harsh
standard imposed by Society of Professional Engineers does not indi-
cate Court dissatisfaction with the learned professions exemption. In-
stead, the Court is formulating a distinction based upon the nature of
the alleged antitrust violation. As noted previously, the society's ban
on competitive bidding, like the advisory fee schedule in Goldfarb, was
a form of price restraint. The standard used in both Goldfarb and Soci-
actual anticompetitive effect as it is a characterization of any restraint on competition. There is no
explicit finding of a tendency to stabilize or fix prices. Moreover, the district court did not invoke
the rule of reason, but instead found the ban on competitive bidding to be a per se violation of the
Sherman Act. United States v. National Soe'y of Professional Eng'rs, 404 F. Supp. 457, 460-61
(D.D.C. 1975), a#'d, 555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1977), aft'd, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). Since the district
court was implying a per se test, its statement (as quoted by the Supreme Court) was not a factual
finding of actual anticompetitive effect.
105. See 435 U.S. at 699, 699-701 (Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in part). But see
notes 112-14 infra and accompanying text.
106. See notes 88-89 supra and accompanying text.
107. 435 U.S. at 696.
108. Id. "Ethical norms may serve to regulate and promote this competition, and thus fall
within the Rule of Reason." Id. Society of Professional Engineers interprets footnote 17 in Gold-
farb as a recognition that since professional services differ in some respects from other business
services, the competitive effect of a restraint on professional services may be different. Miles &
Russell, Economic Competition and the Supreme Court: Decisions in the 1977 Term, 13 U. RICH. L.
REV. 1, 21-22 (1978).
109. This ruling is mourned in Justice Blackmun's dissent in Society of ProfessionalEngineer-.
"[Tihere may be ethical rules which have a more than de minimis anticompetitive effect and yet
are important in a profession's proper ordering." 435 U.S. at 700 (Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ.,
concurring in part). See also Branca & Steinberg, supra note 86, at 507-09. In fact, the Fifth
Circuit held that Society of Professional Engineers does equate public interest with injury to com-
petition. Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 575 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 909 (1979).
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ety of Professional Engineers demonstrates that the Supreme Court
clearly will not allow any interference with the pricing mechanism for
the services of a learned profession. In contrast, Society of Professional
Engineers reiterates footnote seventeen of Goldfarb, indicating that the
activities of a learned profession are distinct, in some way, for antitrust
purposes. The decision in Boddicker, allowing a defendant to justify a
traditional per se violation not involving prices under the public benefit
rule, illustrates the vitality of this distinction outside the price restraint
area. In short, the following guidelines have emerged for the learned
professions: if the alleged antitrust violation is an interference with
competitive pricing, even though not explicit price fixing, the Court will
impose liability under a narrow rule of reason similar to the labeling
process for the per se test. If the alleged antitrust violation is not re-
lated to price fixing, the Court will allow the learned profession to jus-
tify the restraint as an important public service.' 10 The Supreme Court,
in final analysis, exhibits a strong intolerance for any activity that im-
pedes active price competition.
2. An Implication for the Rule of Reason Applicable to Price Infor-
mation Exchanges. The Society of Professional Engineers Court, in
finding a Sherman Act violation under the rule of reason, relied on the
district court finding of an anticompetitive effect based on an interfer-
ence from the ordinary give and take of the market. As noted previ-
ously, however, the district court actually applied a per se standard,"'
which obviates the requirement of finding actual harm to competition.
This implies that the district court never reached the conclusion as-
sumed by the higher court. In short, the holding may mean that ex-
changes of price information will be tested under a truncated rule of
reason test involving only a labeling process-in effect, a per se rule-
so as to create a strong presumption of illegality for any exchange of
price information."12
110. The decision in Mardirosian v. American Inst. of Architects, 474 F. Supp. 628 (D.D.C.
1979), is entirely consistent with this analysis. In that case, the ethical standard of an architects'
association prohibited architects from attempting to obtain, offering to undertake, or accepting a
commission for which another architect had been selected or employed. The plaintiff, an individ-
ual architect, charged that the ethical standard constituted a group boycott, a recognized per se
violation of the Sherman Act. See note 17 supra. Nevertheless, the court declined to characterize
the standard as a per se violation, noting that, in the case of professional associations, "the attempt
[to limit competition is not made] in circumstances where the potential for effectuation of a true
explicit boycott. . . is serious enough to warrant aper se approach." 474 F. Supp. at 638 n.19.
Therefore, as in Boddicker, the court proceeded to examine the challenged activity of a learned
profession under the rule of reason. See text accompanying notes 95-97 supra.
111. See note 104 supra and accompanying text.
112. Despite the Court's insistence that it invoked the rule of reason, it seems clear that a per
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However, a different interpretation of Society of Professional Engi-
neers could yield a more positive answer for the future of price infor-
mation dissemination. The Supreme Court did not explicitly consider
the market structure of the profession, and the failure to do so results in
the further implication that the analysis used in Container Corp. is no
longer in force. This creates another potential limitation upon data dis-
semination. In Society of Professional Engineers, the Court's definition
of the rule of reason does include consideration of "the facts peculiar to
the business," but then the Court, in examining the ban on competitive
bidding, announced that "no elaborate industry analysis is required to
demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an agreement.""' 3
An alternate interpretation is that the Court took notice of an assumed
concentration inherent in the engineering profession and, as in
Container Corp., implied an agreement to stabilize prices. If correct,
this interpretation would give rebirth to the Container Corp. doctrine
and restore the rule of reason to include a complete analysis of eco-
nomic criteria in determining harm to competition.
This interpretation cannot be so easily accepted, however, since
se standard was applied. See Miles & Russell, supra note 108, at 23 n.123. A recent district court
case involving an almost identical restraint invoked the per se rule. United States v. Texas Bd. of
Pub. Accountancy, 464 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Tex. 1978), modfled, 529 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1979)
(Board rule prohibited accountants from submitting competitive bids).
In another price-fixing prosecution involving a professional association, however, the court
found that Society of Professional Engineers "indicated that conduct of professions allegedly in
violation of the antitrust laws may be subjected to a Rule of Reason analysis." Arizona v. Mari-
copa County Medical Soc'y, 1979-I Trade Cas. 62,694, at 77,896 (D. Ariz. 1979). In Maricopa
County Medical Sociey, a physicians' foundation set the maximum fees paid by insurance compa-
nies underwriting foundation approved plans for services performed on patients covered by the
foundation-approved plans. The significance of the holding is that it sanctioned a Boddicker-type
public benefit defense under the rule of reason, permitting "the defendants to show how the chal-
lenged conduct promoted the improvement of professional services to the public. ... Id. at
77,897. Since Society of Professional Engineers did employ a truncated rule of reason, Maricopa
County Medical Society represents the only professional price-fixing case to protect the special
status of the learned professions. However, a possible distinction may be that maximum fee price-
setting is not categorized as a per se violation. See Kallstrom, Health Care Cost Control by Third
Party Payors: Fee Schedules and the Sherman Act, 1978 DUKE L.J. 645, 666-68.
Likewise, in United States v. American Soe'y of Anesthesiologists, 473 F. Supp. 147
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), the pricing activity of a professional association was examined under the rule of
reason, but only after the court had concluded that there was no evidence of an illegal purpose.
The American Society of Anesthesiologists disseminated "relative value guidelines," which were
designed to provide assistance to local anesthesiologist societies or individual anesthesiologists
who participated in the development of local fee schedules. Id. at 153. The court found that this
activity was not a violation of the Sherman Act, since the guides contained no suggestion as to the
monetary value of any procedure and, therefore, did nothing more than describe the relative diffi-
culty of certain anesthesia procedures. Id. at 159. In short, the prosecution failed to demonstrate
any evidence of a likely or actual effect of price fixing.
113. 435 U.S. at 692.
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the opinion in Society of Professional Engineers contains no reference
to any study of the engineering profession. Such a study would be nec-
essary for the conclusion that the industry is interdependent. In fact, it
is by no means clear that the Society situation involved a concentrated
industry from which a Container Corp. conclusion of an anticompeti-
tive agreement can be inferred." 4 In this light, Society of Professional
Engineers returns to its position as a potentially large obstacle to the
exchange of price information.
D. Vertical Price Restrictions. Another Crackdown on Price.
The recent case of Continental T V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,"5
rejected the per se test in regard to a vertical restraint 1 6 that prevented
the retailer from selling outside a particular location. Instead, the
Supreme Court invoked the rule of reason as the proper scope of in-
quiry for all vertical non-price restraints." 7 This decision has been
114. To determine whether a particular industry is sufficiently interdependent to warrant a
conclusion that a price information exchange would subject the industry to a strong possibility of
collusion, it is necessary to examine those conditions that are favorable to the facilitation of collu-
sion. See R. POSNER 135-67 for a general outline of these factors.
A professional organization that can extract compliance from its members is equivalent to a
market with relatively few sellers. Cohesiveness will depend to a large extent upon the benefits
and possible sanctions that the organization can confer upon its members. This, in turn, may be
directly related to a second factor, the strength of entry barriers, and the existence of statutorily
required professional licensing. A third consideration is the homogeneity of the service, which in
the professional context may often be high due to the skilled nature of the work-though this was
not true in Goldfarb where the title examinations were fairly standardized. The elasticity of de-
mand for the services of a given profession is difficult to measure and may ultimately depend upon
the particular service that is being performed. For example, demand for a title examination is less
elastic than demand for an advocate to represent a defendant in traffic court. Finally, the prior
history of the exchange of price information in a profession, by a fee schedule or otherwise, is
important. This is especially so when the exchange was accompanied by penalties for variation.
It is not mandatory that all engineers who consult on a fee basis register with the National
Society of Professional Engineers. Of approximately 325,000 engineers who are registered with
state regulatory bodies, only 69,000 are also members of the National Society. 435 U.S. at 681-82.
This evidences a lack of control over the profession as a whole and therefore does not indicate an
interdependent and cohesive profession. The stated purpose of the National Society is simply to
offer the rather ambiguous benefits of promoting the professional, social, and economic interests
of its members. Id. Apparently the district court found that sanctions were imposed through
direct and indirect communications with members and prospective clients. Id. at 684 n.5. Engi-
neering work would characteristically not be standardized due to the high degree of precision
required. Since five percent of total construction costs are engineering fees, id. at 682, total market
demand may be inelastic. Certainly it is unlikely in light of these facts that the Supreme Court
could out-of-hand conclude that the National Society is a highly interdependent industry subject
to a strong possibility of collusion. That sort of finding would require a more detailed examina-
tion.
115. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
116. A vertical restraint is one placed by the seller on the next party in the line of distribution,
be it a wholesaler or retailer.
117. 433 U.S. at 57-59. In so doing, the Court rejected an earlier distinction made in United
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hailed as a step toward greater recognition of economic factors that
ultimately determine the effect of the vertical restriction." 8
However, the Sylvania decision did not remove application of the
per se rule to vertical price restrictions (that is, resale price mainte-
nance). 1 9 The Court presented no apparent justification for this dis-
tinction and its removal has been advocated. 20 The implication for
price information exchange is that price is again being regarded as a
key area that the courts will protect from manipulation more strin-
gently than any other economic factor. The encouragement of compe-
tition remains the goal of antitrust laws, and the Supreme Court has
chosen price as its central concept, limiting any possible form of re-
straint on price competition.
III. UNITED STATES V UNITED STATES GYPSUM Co.: PRICE
VERIFICATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
Although the learned professions exemption decisions left a strong
implication that communication concerning price among competitors
would rarely be tolerated, the presence of the learned professions issue
clouded the Court's treatment of the exchange of price information.
Subsequently, in United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,2' the issue
of permissible price information exchanges confronted the Supreme
Court in a different context. In attempting to formulate a standard for
the dissemination of price data, just as in the learned professions ex-
emption cases, the Gypsum Court initially addressed a purported ex-
emption to the Sherman Act, the controlling circumstances
exception. 122
The defendants in Gypsum included the four largest producers of
gypsum board, which together with the next four largest producers
comprise more than ninety-four percent of the national market. Gyp-
sum board is widely used in the construction of buildings and resi-
dences. The product itself is essentially standardized, so that price is
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 368-69 (1967), which invoked the rule of reason
when the seller retains the title to the goods, though distributed to the buyer, and applied a per se
test if the restriction accompanies an actual sale.
In a recent application of the Sylvania rule of reason test, the Fifth Circuit stressed the usual
effect on competition, but also stated that market structure is to be emphasized. Kestenbaum v.
Falstaff Brewing Corp., 575 F.2d 564, 570-71 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979).
118. See Note, Future of the Per Se Rule Against Vertical Price Restrictions, 12 GA. L. REV.
612 (1978), But see Posner, supra note 16, at 16.
119. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 270 U.S. 373 (1911); Greene v.
General Foods Corp., 517 F.2d 635 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 942 (1975).
120. See Posner, supra note 16, at 7-9; Note, supra note 118, at 638-39.
121. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
122. See notes 65-76 supra and accompanying text.
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generally the main consideration in the purchaser's choice. The de-
mand for gypsum board is derivative to the demand for the construc-
tion industry as a whole, however, and aggregate sales of gypsum board
are therefore not greatly affected by price fluctuations.
Members of the gypsum industry developed the practice of verify-
ing a competitor's price by telephoning that competitor. They claimed
that this exchange of price information was necessary in order to com-
ply with the Robinson-Patman Act. Section 2(b) of that Act allows a
seller to lower his price to a particular customer if he has a good faith
belief that a competitior has lowered his price.'" 3 The defendants
claimed that consultation with the competitor was necessary to meet
the good faith requirement. 2 4 Nevertheless, the Justice Department
obtained an indictment charging a criminal price-fixing conspiracy
under the Sherman Act, arguing that the Robinson-Patman Act meet-
ing competition defense imposed no duty to verify by checking with the
competitor. Despite the contentions of the defendants that their inter-
seller price verifications fell within the controlling circumstances excep-
tion to the Sherman Act, the district court instructed the jury that the
purpose was irrelevant if they found that the effect of verification was
to stabilize prices.2 5 The jury returned a guilty verdict, but the circuit
court reversed and remanded the case, finding that the trial court in-
struction was erroneous. According to the circuit court, a valid meeting
competition defense would exempt the price verifications from Sher-
man Act liability. 26 The Supreme Court affirmed the decision to re-
mand, but on the grounds of improper "ex parte communications
between the trial judge and the jury foreman' ' 127 and an overly restric-
tive jury instruction regarding withdrawal from the conspiracy. 128
The Supreme Court, employing a rule of reason analysis, dis-
agreed with the circuit court's declaration that such interseller price
verification was a legitimate exception (or "controlling circumstance")
to Sherman Act liability. This announcement left significant doubt
123. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976).
124. See note 11 supra.
125. 438 U.S. at 429-30.
126. 550 F.2d 115, 126 (3d Cir. 1977). The Third Circuit imposed the following requirements
to show the verification practices were-not unlawful:
(1) [TIhe [defendants] engaged in the practice solely to comply with the strictures of
Robinson-Patman; (2) they had first resorted to all other reasonable means of corrobora-
tion, without success; (3) they had good, independent reason to doubt the buyers' truth-
fulness; and (4) their communication with competitors was strictly limited to the one
price and one buyer at issue.
Id.
127. 438 U.S. at 459.
128. Id. at 459-65.
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about the future of price information exchanges between competitors.
For the purpose of this Comment, three considerations need explora-
tion: (1) criminal price fixing under the Sherman Act, (2) the end of the
"controlling circumstances" exception, and (3) the future of price infor-
mation exchanges and the rule of reason.
A. Criminal Price Fixing Under the Sherman Act.
The Supreme Court in Gypsum ruled that the "effects alone" test
proposed by the district court jury instructions was improper. Wishing
to avoid the imposition of a strict liability offense under the antitrust
laws, the Court required that some purpose to restrain competition be
found in criminal cases to satisfy the criminal mens rea requirement. 29
Therefore, in applying the rule of reason to a criminal charge under the
Sherman Act, both a purpose and an effect of injuring competition
must be established for a finding of criminal liability.13 0 This require-
ment does not change the usual rule for a civil antitrust action that a
"violation can be established by proof of either an unlawful purpose or
an anticompetitive effect."'' 3'
The requisite intent established by the Supreme Court for a crimi-
nal prosecution is "knowledge of probable consequences." This, cou-
pled with an anticompetitive effect, will suffice for a criminal
conviction.132  Under the per se rule, this lesser standard of intent
129. Id. at 435-38. After the commencement of the Gypsum case, Congress increased the
criminal penalties for violation of the Sherman Act. Criminal violations are now treated as felo-
nies and are punishable by a fine not to exceed $1,000,000 or imprisonment or both. 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1976). The Fourth Circuit subsequently refused to recognize any change in the substantive ele-
ments of a price-fixing violation as the result of this amendment, stating: "In increasing the penal-
ties for violating § I and redefining the offense as a felony, Congress did not intend to change the
elements of the offense." United States v. Foley, 598 F.2d 1323, 1335 (4th Cir. 1979); accord,
United States v. Continental Group, Inc., 603 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1979). For a recommendation that
imprisonment for Sherman Act violations be eliminated and penalties be assessed commensurate
with the probable harm to competition, see R. POSNER 221-36.
130. See 438 U.S. at 438-40, 444. The rule of reason standard is appropriately applied to a
price information exchange case, like Gypsum, where no unlawful agreement is found. Id. at 441
n.16.
131. Id. at 436 n.13. Accord, id. at 446 n.22.
132. Id. at 444. This does not preclude a finding of criminal liability when a specific intent to
violate the Sherman Act is found, but no evidence of an actual anticompetitive effect is intro-
duced. Id. at 444 n.21. Under this standard, the defendant's sophistication may become impor-
tant. Large corporations may be more likely to be found to have knowledge of the consequences
of their actions. See Miles & Russell, supra note 108, at 17.
Moreover, a recent district court decision found the "knowledge of probable circumstances"
test applicable to civil antitrust actions as well. City of Mishawaka, Inc. v. American Elec. Power
Co., 465 F. Supp. 1320, 1334 (N.D. Ind. 1979) ("If intent can be inferred from conduct in criminal
antitrust cases, it obviously can be inferred in civil actions...").
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should not be sufficient, and it should be necessary to establish an
agreement with an unlawful purpose on the part of the defendants to
violate the Sherman Act. 133
Ostensibly, criminal prosecutions would be brought only for the
more serious and sinister violations. The defendants in Gypsum
claimed they were acting under the assumption of a controlling circum-
stance exception and for the lawful purpose of complying with the
Robinson-Patman Act. Although it appears that the defendants were
acting with the knowledge that prices could be stabilized, they were not
found to have arranged a price-fixing conspiracy.' 34 Gypsum is the first
major price information exchange case before the Supreme Court to
involve a criminal prosecution. The case indicates that the Justice De-
partment is taking a tough stance on price information exchange, view-
133. Refusing to treat antitrust violations as strict liability crimes, 438 U.S. at 438, the
Supreme Court requires a finding of intent for a criminal prosecution. A per se conviction does
not require the finding of an actual anticompetitive effect. See notes 27-29 supra and accompany-
ing text. Since Gypsum allows a criminal conviction on a finding of unlawful purpose, see note
132 supra, the per se rule should require this same degree of intent, and the lesser standard of
"knowledge of probable consequences" should be insufficient. Nevertheless, the per se rule used
in a recent criminal case did employ this lesser standard of intent, without any specific finding of
anticompetitive effect. United States v. Continental Group, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 704, 716-18, 722-23
(E.D. Pa. 1978), aft'd, 603 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1979) (if the court had searched for actual harm, it
would not have been applying the per se rule but rather a rule of reason). This decision misinter-
prets the Gypsum decision. To obtain a criminal conviction under the per se rule, "the govern-
ment [is] obligated, under Gypsum, to prove that defendants possessed a specific intent to produce
such an effect." 603 F.2d at 469 (Hunter, J., concurring).
Some commentators have asserted that the use of the per se test is unconstitutional for a
criminal antitrust prosecution. See, e.g., C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLIcY 256
(1959) ("There is more than a little merit in the complaint that criminal sanctions are inappropri-
ate for those areas of antitrust law where violations depend on essentially economic judgments on
which reasonable Supreme Court justices may and do differ"); Brosnahan & Dowling, The Consti-
tuionality of the Per Se Rule in Criminal Antitrust Prosecutions, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 55
(1975). However, this view has not been adopted by any court. See United States v. Continental
Group, Inc., 456 F. Supp. at 718; United States v. Brighton Bldg. & Maintenance Co., 435 F.
Supp. 222, 227-28 (N.D. Ill. 1977), aff'd, 598 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1979). Furthermore, a recent
statement by the then Deputy Attorney General, presently Attorney General, Benjamin Civiletti
emphasized that "per se violations of the antitrust laws are those [violations] which the Depart-
ment prosecutes criminally .. " Remarks by Benjamin R. Civiletti at the Annual Meeting of
the Rock-Tenn. Co. (Oct. 21, 1978). While the statement makes it clear that the per se rule is still
considered viable by the Department of Justice for criminal violations, it is particularly confusing
because Civiletti was basing his remarks upon the recent Gypsum decision, which purported not to
apply a per se test.
However, two recent circuit court decisions have ruled that, in the case of a criminal per se
price-fixing violation, the intent requirement will be satisfied by proof of the price-fixing conspir-
acy alone. United States v. Brighton Bldg. & Maintenance Co., 598 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Gillen, 599 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1979).
134. According to the statements of Civiletti, this should not, therefore, be a criminal prosecu-
tion, since it was not a per se price-fixing case. Civiletti Remarks, supra note 133.
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ing it as the near equivalent of a price-fixing conspiracy. 35
B. The End of the Controlling Circumstance Exceptionfor the
Robinson-Patman Act.
As discussed previously, the lower federal courts interpreted a
phrase in Container Corp., referring to a "controlling circumstance" in
the Cement Manufacturers case, as creating an exception to Sherman
Act liability for interseller price verification under the Robinson-Pat-
man Act.' 36  The so-called "controlling circumstances exception,"
which originated in Cement Manufacturers because of persistent buyer
fraud, 137 was not entirely eliminated by Gypsum, but the opinion unde-
niably abrogates any exception to the Sherman Act for interseller ver-
ification under the meeting competition defense of section 2(b) of the
Robinson-Patman Act, and, at most, leaves only a narrow exception
deriving from Cement Manufacturers. 38
In Gypsum, the Supreme Court found no conflict between the
Sherman Act and the Robinson-Patman Act to warrant the exception
claimed by the defendants, which would permit unlimited exchanges of
price information between sellers. Instead, the Court asserted that a
proper accommodation could be found for both acts.1 39 However, the
two laws do not have the same emphasis in the price information ex-
change context, and therefore, their goals will not always coincide. The
purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act was to prevent price discrimina-
tion by a seller that would injure both competitors (primary-line injury)
and buyers not receiving the discrimination in price (secondary-line in-
jury).140 Although prevention of the latter injury was the main objec-
tive of the act,' 4' section 2(b) seeks to allow a seller an opportunity to
135. In his remarks, Civiletti stated that the Justice Department has two goals in using crimi-
nal sanctions to deter violations:
(1) [W]e want to uncover existing price fixing and stop its disastrous effects on honest
businessmen and consumers alike; and (2) [W]e want to make sure that present and
would-be price fixers know that they run a large risk and will have to pay a heavy price if
they are found out-we must try to deter this destructive conduct.
Civiletti Remarks, supra note 133, at 7. The second condition does not seem to fit the Gypsum
facts, which did not involve a covert arrangement to fix prices.
136. See text accompanying notes 65-76 supra.
137. The Robinson-Patman Act attempts to proscribe buyer fraud in section 2(f). 15 U.S.C.
§ 13(f) (1976). This section makes it unlawful for a buyer to knowingly induce or receive a price
discrimination that would otherwise be unlawful for the seller to grant under section 2(b) of the
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976).
138. 438 U.S. at 448-59.
139. Id. at 452-53. Contra, Levi, The Robinson-Paman Act-Is It in the Public Interest?, 1
ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 60, 62 (1952).
140. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1 I, at 4-5.
141. Id. 5.
1032 [Vol. 1979:1004
SEPARA TE RULE OF REASON
maintain a sales relationship with a particular client when the seller has
a good faith belief that his client has received a lower offer from a
competitor. This implies a duty to verify the lower price offered by his
competitor, and the courts do speak of a duty "to investigate or ver-
ify.51 42 Thus, under this defense, the Robinson-Patman Act would en-
courage price information exchange. Equally clear is the fact that the
Sherman Act prohibits the exchange of price information that stabilizes
prices, and therefore, the Sherman Act would discourage the exchange
of price information in many instances. This evaluation does demon-
strate an uneasy combination of the two laws arising in the Gypsum
case.
The accommodation of these laws finds the Sherman Act favored
by legal and economic critics, 143 the Justice Department, 144 and the
Supreme Court, both previously 145 and now in Gypsum. The Gypsum
Court reaffirmed the standard it adopted in FTC v. A.E Staley Manu-
facturing Co., 146 which had provided that a valid "good faith meeting
competition" defense requires the seller to "show the existence of facts
which would lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that the
granting of a lower price would in fact meet the equally low price of a
competitor."' 147 Yet to satisfy this standard, the Court finds that no "di-
rect discussions of price between competitors are required"'148 and in
fact, that even where the seller has "vague, generalized doubts about
the reliability of [the purchaser],"' 149 the seller can satisfy the standard
"by efforts falling short of interseller verification. . .. ",150 In a sweep-
ing announcement based on the assumption of a highly concentrated
market, the Court concludes that interseller price verification cannot
solve the problem of inadequate information and could lead to the sta-
bility of prices.' 15  This, for all practical purposes, ends the meeting
142. FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 758 (1945).
143. The Robinson-Patman Act has come under a barrage of criticism and many have advo-
cated its repeal. See generally R. POSNER, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT: FEDERAL REGULATION
OF PRICE DIFFERENCES (1976); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 8-101, 210-51; Cooper,
Price Discrimination Law and Economic Efficiency, 75 MICH. L. REV. 962 (1977); America's 40-
Year Wrangle, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 26, 1978, at 61. Meanwhile, the Sherman, Act receives
plaudits.
144. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 58-59.
145. See Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 74 (1953) (stating that the Robinson-
Patman Act should be interpreted to achieve compliance with "the broader antitrust policies that
have been laid down by Congress").
146. 324 U.S. 746 (1945).
147. Id. at 759-60.
148. 438 U.S. at 453.
149. Id. at 454.
150. Id.
151. With the elimination of interseller price verification, Gypsum indicates in a footnote that
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competition defense as a controlling circumstances exception:
To recognize even a limited "controlling circumstance" exception for
interseller verification in such circumstances would be to remove
from scrutiny under the Sherman Act conduct falling near its core
with no assurance, and indeed with serious doubts, that competing
antitrust policies would be served thereby. . . . [E]xchanges of price
information-even when putatively for purposes of Robinson-Pat-
man Act compliance-must remain subject to close scrutiny under
the Sherman Act.'
5 2
Following the broad sweep of Gypsum, the viability of the original
buyer fraud exception of Cement Manufacturers is also in serious
doubt. Gypsum did not explicitly overrule Cement Manufacturers nor
any of the lower court decisions purporting to follow it via the
Container Corp. "controlling circumstance" dicta. However, it is pal-
verification by buyers, supervised by section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act, will become the
chief method of complying with the good faith requirement of the meeting competition defense.
See note 137 supra. In footnote 30, the Court stated:
It may ... turn out that sustained enforcement of § 2(f) of the ... Robinson-Patman
Act, which imposes liability on buyers for inducing illegal price discounts, will serve to
bolster the credibility of buyer's representations and render reliance thereon by sellers a
more reasonable and secure predicate for a finding of good faith under § 2(b).
438 U.S. at 455 n.30.
Enforcement of this section may be imperative to afford sellers a good faith belief to lower
their price under section 2(b); otherwise, buyer misrepresentation could be widespread. Seegener-
ally Curtis, Buyer Liabiliy Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 42 ANTITRUST L.J. 345 (1973);
Galanti, Buyer Liabilityfor Inducing or Receiving Discriminatory Prices, Terms, and Promotional
Allowances" Caveat Emptor in the 1970's, 7 IND. L. REv. 962 (1974); Note, The Evolving Duty of an
Innocent Buyer to Inquire into His Bargain Under Section 2() of the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 IND.
L.J. 348 (1974).
The Supreme Court recently interpreted section 2(f) in Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440
U.S. 69 (1979) (A & P). A & P solicited a lower price by telling the seller that only a substantial
reduction in his offer would put him "in the ball park" of the competition. The seller told A & P
that it could only justify the lower price under a meeting competition defense. A & P, upon
accepting the new offer, did not notify the buyer that its price had not merely met the competition
but had beaten it. The Supreme Court reversed an FTC order finding A & P in violation of
section 2(f) for knowingly inducing an illegal price. Id. at 85. A buyer who has done no more
than accept the lowest price competitively offered does not violate the Robinson-Patman Act if the
seller has a meeting competition defense, which the seller in A & P did. Id. at 81.
A & P represents a desire to avoid price stability. A duty of affirmative disclosure of all offers
received by the buyer would frustrate competitive bidding by eliminating all uncertainty in the
negotiating process. See Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47, 56 (1st Cir. 1964) (stating that
"neither the buyer nor seller expects. . . , or can be expected, to lay all his cards face up on the
table. Battle of wits is the rule. Haggling has ever been the way of the market place"), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965); Comment, Interseller Price Verfcatlion and Hard Bargaining: Recon-
ciliation of the Sherman Act, Robinson-Patman Act and the Forces of Competition, 46 FORDHAM L.
REV. 824, 870 (1978).
4 & P did not disturb the holding in Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971). Kroger established that where a buyer misrepresents to an innocent
seller that he has a lower offer from a competitor, buyer liability is independent of seller liability.
438 F.2d at 1377. A & P distinguishes Kroger as a "lying buyer" situation. 440 U.S. at 81-82 n.15.
152. 438 U.S. at 458-59.
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pable that those lower court decisions formulated the same controlling
circumstances exception eliminated by Gypsum. Cement Manufacturers
pre-dated the enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act and to a large
extent addressed the same issue: the ability of a buyer to induce a
lower price through a fraudulent report. Under the Gypsum decision,
therefore, only a very narrow limitation, at most, could remain under
Cement Manufacturers designed to prevent buyer fraud by permitting
verification.153
Gypsum quite obviously eliminates a significant area of price in-
formation exchange, and given the continued existence of the Robin-
son-Patman Act, it also ends one of the more prominent uses of price
information exchange. Once again the Court is cautiously guarding the
goal of price competition, and although Gypsum recognizes the value of
price information exchange, 154 the decision does not explicitly exempt
any form of price information dissemination from Sherman Act liabil-
ity. Therefore, it is necessary to interpret the rule of reason applied by
Gypsum to predict the future of price information exchanges.
C. The Future of Price Information Exchange and the Rule of
Reason.
As discussed previously,155 the Supreme Court, in Society of Pro-
fessional Engineers, did not extend Sherman Act immunity under the
learned professions exemption to the professional engineering associa-
tion. 156 Similarly, the Gypsum Court eliminated the controlling cir-
cumstances exception for price verification among competitors. In both
cases, therefore, the Court examined the challenged price restraint
under the rule of reason, unimpeded by any exemptions to the Sher-
man Act. The future scope of permissible price information exchanges
will be determined by the breadth of this rule of reason.
1. The Rule of Reason in Gypsum. In Gypsum, the Court clari-
fied the decision of Container Corp. as endorsing a rule of reason stan-
dard and then went one step further in citing that case for the
proposition that the rule of reason should consider "[a] number of fac-
tors including most prominently the structure of the industry involved
and the nature of the information exchanged . . . [to divine] the
procompetitive or anticompetitive effects of this type of interseller com-
153. See id. at 446-47 n.22.
154. Id. at 441 n.16.
155. See text accompanying notes 98-102 supra.
156. 435 U.S. at 696.
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munication."t 57 If followed faithfully, this would be the first Supreme
Court decision since Container Corp. to examine price information ex-
change by a market structure analysis to determine the true effect of the
restraint on competition. In fact, Chief Justice Burger's opinion does
proceed to analyze the effect of interseller price verification in a highly
concentrated market structure and concludes that "[p]rice concessions
by oligopolists generally yield competitive advantages only if secrecy
can be maintained; when the terms of the concessions are made pub-
licly known, other competitors are likely to follow and any advantage
to the initiator is lost in the process."' 8 This theoretical discourse was
said to be applicable for both infrequent, one-shot verifications 5 9 and
for an explicit agreement among competitors for reciprocal verifica-
tion.' 60
The earlier discussion of markets' 6' fully supports the Gypsum
Court's conclusion that "in oligopolistic industries such as the gypsum
board industry, the exchange of price information among competitors
carries with it the added potential for the development of concerted
price-fixing arrangements which lie at the core of the Sherman Act's
prohibitions."' 62 The evidence adduced by the trial court concerning
the structure of the gypsum board industry identified it as one of the
industries that could facilitate, explicitly or tacitly, super-competitive
157. 438 U.S. at 441 n.16. For earlier discussion of the Container Corp. test, see notes 47-50 &
55-64 supra and accompanying text.
158. 438 U.S. at 456.
159. Chief Justice Burger states:
[I]f one seller offers a price concession for the purpose of winning over one of his com-
petitor's customers, it is unlikely that the same seller will freely inform its competitor of
the details of the concession so that it can be promptly matched and diffused. . . .Thus
verification, if undertaken on a one-shot basis for the sole purpose of complying with the
§ 2(b) defense, does not hold out much promise as a means of shoring up buyers' repre-
sentation.
Id. at 456-57.
160. The opinion reads:
[A]n agreement, either tacit or express, providing for reciprocity among competitors in
the exchange of price information. . . would make little economic sense. . . if its sole
purpose were to guarantee all participants the opportunity to match the secret price con-
cessions of other participants [since] each seller would know that his price concession
could not be kept from his competitors and no seller participating in the information-
exchange arrangement would, therefore, have any incentive for deviating from the pre-
vailing price level in the industry.
Id. at 457.
This belief is not universally accepted. Although a seller may know of a price reduction by
his competitor, he may not immediately be able to meet his competitor's price because, for exam-
ple, of production restraints. See R. POSNER 44. Furthermore, by lowering his price, a seller
could create new growth in the market depending on the elasticity of demand. This may not only
bring in more sales directly, but also may produce benefits from lower costs achieved through
economies of scale. Id. 44-45. See Posner, supra note 13, at 1566-69.
161. See notes 30-36 supra and accompanying text.
162. 438 U.S. at 457.
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pricing.1 63 Therefore, it would appear that Gypsum may have returned
to the use of economic criteria in looking for evidence of price stabiliza-
tion.
However, it would be too hasty a conclusion to say that there has
been an actual return to the standard proposed in Container Corp. The
rule of reason approach of Gypsum did discuss market structure in
depth, but the Court equated the oligopoly situation with that of all
markets. By foregoing any examination of the competitive structure of
the market, the Court generalized from the specific facts of Gypsum
that interseller price verification is inherently unreasonable. As a result
of this belief, the majority of the Court decided effectively to terminate
this substantial form of price information exchange. In so doing, the
Gypsum Court did not adopt the insights offered by market structure
analysis as applied in Container Corp. The rule of reason for price dis-
semination remains limited in scope to the details of the particular plan
of verification.
In assuming an interdependent and possibly collusive market
structure as its standard of analysis for price verification, the Court in
Gypsum in effect applied a per se test to price information exchanges.
The test imposed by the Gypsum decision is whether the competitors'
"knowledge of probable circumstances" of their price verification
would disclose an anticompetitive effect. 64 In a preliminary inquiry
equivalent to the labeling process, this required intent would be easy to
find, once the Court assumed an oligopolistic industry in which com-
petitors are particularly aware of one another's actions. 65 This conclu-
sion, viewed together with the trends exposed by the learned
professions exemption decisions, indicates a limited future for the ex-
change of price information.
2. The Standardfor the Exchange ofPrice Information. Although
163. For the characteristics of a market susceptible to collusive pricing, see note 53 supra.
Posner's first stage analysis would identify the Gypsum situation as a likely candidate for potential
collusion.
The gypsum board industry is highly concentrated (the eight largest firms have 94% of the
market). No substantial fringe of small sellers exists that could limit the defendant's power. Fur-
ther, demand for gypsum board is derivative to that for construction, so that price fluctuations in
gypsum are largely ignored (inelastic demand). There is low concentration on the buying side and
the product itself is fungible. Finally, the industry's antitrust record is not without prior civil
lawsuits. All these factors identify the industry as one with a potential for price collusion.
164. See notes 132-33 supra and accompanying text.
165. See Penne v. Greater Minneapolis Area Bd. of Realtors, 5 TRADE REG. RaP. (CCH)
62,820 (8th Cir. 1979). The publication of prices by the board of realtors was not ruled to be a
per se violation. Moreover, the court did not assume the presence of an interdependent market,
but, instead, remanded the case for a finding of the actual effect of the publication.
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no Supreme Court decision has enunciated a specific standard for the
treatment of price information exchanges, the trend of the Court is
clearly to establish a substantial barrier to their permissibility. Two
critical observations emerge from the language of the opinions: first,
Sherman Act enforcement is preeminent and uncompromised by any
other antitrust law or public benefit; second, the rule of reason for price
information exchanges lacks the essential balancing of effects on com-
petition to determine the existence of real price stabilization.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, in unqualified terms, prohibits any
business activity that operates as a restraint of trade.166 The Supreme
Court is interpreting this statute broadly, as discouraging any arrange-
ment between competitors that has a tendency to affect the competitive
pricing system. In both Goldfarb and Society ofProfessionalEngineers,
the Court ruled that the defendant professional organizations violated
the Sherman Act, despite contentions that the advisory fee schedule
and ban on competitive bidding actually served to promote the public
interest. Since it appears very likely that some form of the learned pro-
fessions exemption continues, 167 these decisions demonstrate that the
Court is looking to the nature of the restraint in deciding whether to
enforce the Sherman Act strictly. If the restraint is one affecting price,
the learned professions exemption will not apply.
Likewise, the Gypsum Court held that Sherman Act discourage-
ment of price information exchanges takes priority over Robinson-Pat-
man Act emphasis on verification of a competitor's offer under the
meeting competition defense. This pressure against price dissemina-
tion is even stronger when the action brought for price fixing is a crimi-
nal one.16 8 In short, both the learned professions exemption and
Robinson-Patman Act justifications are ineffective in countering the
Court's concern for policing pricing activities through the Sherman
Act.
In addition to distinguishing price information exchanges by elim-
inating all exemptions to the Sherman Act for these communications,
the Court has fashioned an abbreviated rule of reason for use in these
situations. Unlike the Container Corp. standard, which looks to the ec-
onomic circumstances surrounding the exchange of price information,
the approach used in Society of Professional Engineers and Gypsum in-
volved an inquiry no broader than a labeling process. Although nomi-
nally applying a "rule of reason," each case failed to examine the
structure of the relevant market in which the pricing-related activity
166. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
167. See text accompanying notes 90-97 supra.
168. See Civiletti Remarks, supra note 133.
1038 [Vol. 1979:1004
Vol. 1979:1004] SEPARATE 1ULE OF REASON
occurred. 169 Without this exploration, no court can find the true rea-
sonableness of the restraint: that is, whether the restraint, on balance,
promotes or suppresses competition. 7° This leaves nothing more than
a per se test.
By rejecting all justifications for a price information exchange and
by reducing the scope of its inquiry to a mere labeling process, the
Supreme Court is exhibiting extreme disapproval of exchanges of price
information. 7 ' Apparently, only those exchanges of prices that are
sufficiently removed in time and directness to eliminate the taint of a
potential agreement or conspiracy to violate the Sherman Act will be
permitted. Therefore, under the Gypsum and Society of Professional
Engineers rule of reason approach, the elements of a permissible price
dissemination would probably include the use of historical data,'72 in-
formation given voluntarily and published only to be advisory, 173 in-
formation made available to the public, 174 and information published
by an association without any direct profit incentive. 175
169. See notes 111-14 & 157-65 supra and accompanying text.
170. See note 16 supra.
171. The Supreme Court has subsequently indicated that an exchange of price information is
impermissible in Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69 (1979). See note 151 supra.
While warning against the danger of price stability, the Court stated that "[b]ecause of the evils of
collusive action, the Court has held that the exchange of price information by competitors violates
the Sherman Act." 440 U.S. at 80.
172. Obviously, current price information carries a greater potential for price fixing. See
Note, 63 VA. L. REV., supra note 49, at 667. Recent cases have regarded this factor differently in
formulating consent decrees. See United States v. Wholesale Tobacco Distribs., Inc., 5 TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 62,588 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (consent decree enjoined distribution of proposed and
current prices, except as necessary to bona fide sales between the competitors themselves); United
States v. Enderle Metal Prods. Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 62,517 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (consent
decree enjoined distribution of future and proposed prices, but not the price obtained in a bona
fide transaction); United States v. Owensboro River Sand & Gravel Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 62,519 (W.D. Ky. 1979) (stipulation identical to that in Enderle); United States v. Arrow
Overall Supply Co., 1978-2 Trade Cas. 62,275 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (consent decree prohibited
exchanging price information without qualification at the time the price is quoted to buyers);
United States v. Great W. Sugar Co., 1978-2 Trade Cas. 62,235 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (consent decree
enjoined exchange of information concerning future prices by sellers and their trade association,
but not to proposed or actual bona fide sales). Another district court decision took a compromise
approach. See United States v. Dixo Co., 1978-2 Trade Cas. 62,353, at 76,128 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)
(final judgment order enjoined all exchanges of price information with any other distributor "con-
cerning any actual or proposed price, price change or discount.. . prior to communication of
such information to the public or to customers generally"). Accord, United States v. Kliegman
Bros., 5 TRADE REo. REP. 1 62,428 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
173. This qualification was indicated in Goldfarb, which stated that "[a] purely advisory fee
schedule issued to provide guidelines, or an exchange of price information without a showing of
an actual restraint of trade would present us with a different question. ... 421 U.S. at 781.
174. This was a primary feature of the price dissemination plans upheld by the Supreme Court
in Maple Flooring and other early cases. See notes 39-44 supra and accompanying text.
175. Trade associations, which are not controlled by the major producers in the industry, are
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IV. CONCLUSION
The rule of reason is the standard of analysis adopted by the
courts to determine whether a particular business practice, which is not
overtly pernicious, is a violation of the Sherman Act. Under that test,
the critical inquiry is whether the challenged activity tends to promote
or suppress competition. Economic theory discloses that it is essential
to examine the structure of the market in which the dissemination is
conducted in order to determine whether a practice of price informa-
tion exchange violates section I of the Sherman Act by stabilizing
prices. In Container Corp., the Supreme Court formulated a rule of
reason for price information exchange that took market structure into
account.
Beginning with the learned professions exemption decisions of
Goldfarb and Society of Professional Engineers, the Supreme Court has
significantly curtailed the scope of investigation under the rule of rea-
son. The Goldfarb Court refused to find a learned professions exemp-
tion in price-related cases, but the Court has indicated that special
treatment to the learned professions in non-price situations is appropri-
ate. In Boddicker, a Ninth Circuit case, this special treatment took the
form of a public benefit assessment closely akin to the state action ex-
emption. Society of Professional Engineers emphatically denied a pub-
lic benefit assessment to a ban on competitive bidding. In so doing, the
Supreme Court, while claiming to apply a rule of reason test, implied
two important conclusions: that the Container Corp. rule of reason is
no longer in use and that any restraint that interferes with the competi-
tive pricing mechanism cannot be justified.
Gypsum removed any ambiguity concerning the future of price in-
formation exchange. It rejected the meeting competition defense of the
Robinson-Patman Act as an exception to Sherman Act enforcement.
While giving lip service to the Container Corp. standard, the Supreme
Court avoided the task of examining the economic characteristics of the
industry by assuming a concentrated and potentially collusive market
structure. Price verification in that sort of market can quite easily lead
to price stabilization, but it may lead to a more efficient ordering in a
ldss concentrated market. Since Gypsum was a criminal prosecution,
the Court required a finding that the defendants had "knowledge of
probable consequences" of the price verification. However, given the
assumption of a highly interdependent market structure, every defend-
ant will be found to have the requisite intent.
not likely to be attempting to fix prices by publishing general industry data for the public's infor-
mation.
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The new rule of reason for price information exchange, in disre-
garding potential competitive and legislative justifications, is actually
only a labeling process, examining the details of the particular practice
only to decide whether to apply per se liability. Under that standard,
the exchange of price information will rarely be permissible, regardless
of the purpose and circumstances of conveyance.
Edward J Schneidman
